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A smart strategy for the use of force
Volker Perthes

As the world becomes increasingly interdependent and multi-polar, the "smart power" approach is becoming the new strategy for our times. Yet, even smart power relies, among other elements, on the use of armed force. Smart power, in essence, is what the classical concept of statecraft means: the art of strategically combining all instruments, hard and soft, which a state has at its disposal, and doing so wisely. The use of force should be the ultima ratio and the continuation of politics by other means. This Clausewitzian notion has often been misinterpreted. It does not mean that the use of force begins where politics end, but rather that even the use of force needs to be guided by a political strategy, and state leaders must not employ their armed forces without knowing the political results they want to achieve. This is a key monitum for current discussions over military deployments.

The current security scenario and military intervention
The risk of major wars has been greatly reduced since the end of the Cold War, particularly for the countries that were located at its centre. Europe, as the European Security Strategy rightly notes, "has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free." In many other parts of the world, too, the end of the Cold War has reduced tensions; and globalisation has brought about a more economically and socially integrated world with a much stronger interest in "harmony" and "win-win-situations", peaceful international relations, and stability. Note that the most war-prone regions today (the wider Middle East and parts of sub-Saharan Africa) are also the least globalised.

It is therefore not so much traditional interstate confrontations as rather the so-called new security threats, that have triggered discussions about remaining risks and challenges (both to the security of states and to human and societal security), and how to address them. These threats are partly transnational and can become more virulent as a result of globalisation and the interconnectedness of the world. The European Union, in its security strategy, lists terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, and state failure (which can fuel extremism, terrorism, and other threats that may spread beyond the conflict region), organised crime as key threats,, and the competition for natural resources and energy depend-encies as further sources of potential conflict. Global climate change has been added; it is seen as a threat-multiplier that undermines stability and may trigger conflicts and large-scale population movements.

It is generally agreed that these challenges can only be dealt with through interna-tional cooperation, ideally on a global level. At the same time, it is notable that military power remains an option for responding to these neo-security challenges. Note that, for example, the EU is developing its European Security and Defence Policy, building up planning and command capacities of its own, and aiming at fielding up tens of thousands troops for up to 19 parallel crisis missions and peace keeping operations. Note also that the number of military personnel deployed in UN missions has been continuously on the rise (from some 10,000 in 1997 to close to 80,000 in 2008).

The question of military intervention to deal with crises remains a difficult one and it is a political decision that each state has to take with regard to its own interests, preferences, and capabilities. Yet, when assessing the merits of each case, a "smart power" approach to military intervention should rest on two interconnected pillars: legitimacy and effectiveness. The legitimacy of an intervention is not only necessary to generate support for the use of force, but is also an element for its success on the ground. At the same time, a mission that is ineffective or seen as a failure will soon lose its legitimacy in the eyes of all involved actors.

Levels of legitimacy: international, regional and local
For the intervening countries, legitimacy is mainly related to the purpose of an intervention. For example, the EU has defined a functional list of forms and levels of interventions for which it wants to be prepared and which it regards as legitimate and permissible in the sense of pursuing a benign intention, or even the common good. This list, termed the "Petersberg tasks" includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management. As useful as this categorisation may be, the fact that a mission is characterised as falling under the Petersberg tasks, or that it responds to the need to enforce international law (as recently in the case of EU's Atalanta anti-piracy mission), does not necessarily give it international legitimacy.

International legitimacy depends critically, but not solely on the mandate of a mission, i.e., on its legality. From a European perspective, interventions should never be carried out unilaterally, should be authorized by an international mandate, ideally from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Mandates from regional organisa-tions authorising the invention of regional states in regional crises may also be seen as legitimate. Self-mandating (as by NATO in the 1999 Kosovo war) is a dangerous exemption; it certainly does not give international legality to an intervention, which affects legitimacy. The same would apply to a mandate from an alliance of democra-cies, or any other coalition of like-minded states.

Yet, even the legitimacy of the UNSC is not absolute. An international mandate may still not give sufficient legitimacy to an intervention in the eyes of all relevant actors, particularly in a regional context. The authorisation (after the invasion) of the US presence in Iraq by the UNSC has not made these troops legitimate in the eyes of many Iraqis. On the contrary, resistance to these troops has been seen as legitimate by public opinion and leaders in the region, which in turn has greatly undermined the effectiveness of the mission. Or consider, theoretically, a situation where the UNSC would authorise an intervention into Sudan in order to arrest president Bashir on the basis of the arrest warrant of the International Criminal Court - would this be seen as legitimate? For much of the international community, as represented in the Security Council, certainly yes. For many African and Arab states, or at least large sections of public opinion in these states, probably not.

Legitimacy, therefore, also rests on the broadest possible consensus of local and regional actors: there is not only international legitimacy, but also regional and local legitimacy. This had been taken into consideration after the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, and expressed by inviting (almost) all local forces and regional powers to the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the United States and its partners have only belatedly realised that such an inclusive regional approach will also be needed to deal with the insurgency and to secure the long-term stabilisation of Afghanistan.

Effective interventions: the limits of military force
For a military intervention to be effective, the international mandate authorising it has to be appropriate to the tasks of a mission. It needs to be robust enough (nor-mally by authorising the mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) and to author-ise a sufficient number of personnel so that international forces will be able to fulfil their task even in the face of armed resistance. The use of force is the ultima ratio, but not necessarily the last instrument to be employed in a crisis. Much bloodshed could have probably been avoided if the UN troops in Bosnia or in Rwanda had a more robust mandate.

In the same sense, states that intervene (and the mandate that authorises their intervention) need to define the tasks of a mission very clearly - both as a guideline to those who carry out the mission and to help them to deploy the appropriate combination of military forces and civilian experts, and to signal to local and regional actors what the intervention is about. A clear definition of tasks is also necessary in order to determine the success of a mission (which also defines its envisioned end and the exit of foreign forces). Is it a police mission to apprehend a group of criminals or terrorists? Is it about stabilising a fragile state or about quelling violence between local groups and regional states? Is it about state building, and to what extent is success defined by criteria such as the holding of democratic elections and the implementation of human rights standards? Goals must not be set too high or be too vague, lest a mission creates expectations which it cannot fulfil (thereby undermin-ing both its legitimacy and effectiveness).

Area and country specific knowledge is one element of success. Decision-makers have occasionally to be reminded that not all local and regional conflicts can be dealt with by the same mixture of instruments. Traditions, local political cultures, cultural sensitivities, and, of course, the nature of local and regional conflicts have to be properly understood to make interventions a success. This does not only mean that policymakers should seek the advice of area specialists (which apparently was largely neglected before the Iraq invasion). More significantly, it underlines the need to involve actors from the region in the decision-making process and in the implemen-tation of an intervention mission.

For the local population, the legitimacy of a foreign intervention is ultimately de-pendent on whether it is seen as improving their situation or not. Whether this is the case cannot be determined with regard to one set of objective data - such as eco-nomic growth, or the number of schools built. Human security (the protection of the life, health and property of the local people) is key, but the feeling of improvement also depends on concepts that are difficult to quantify such as justice, good govern-ance and development. Intervening states should ensure that: human security is a key consideration for the use of force; building trust with the people is more impor-tant than the elimination of enemies; deployed troops are accountable; local police forces and justice systems are built up quickly; and local authorities are supported in delivering good governance.

Peace operations and crisis interventions almost always last longer than originally envisioned. Sometimes, the mere presence of foreign troops provides reasons to extent a mission: foreign soldiers can easily be perceived as occupiers - even if they do not see themselves that way - and consequently be confronted with an insur-gency that requires even more troops. This is what we are experiencing in Afghani-stan. More often, however, an international political and military presence creates dependencies which some local actors may find comfortable: fundamental social problems and political conflicts can remain unaddressed as long as international troops are there to prevent new outbreaks of violence or civil war. On the other hand it is important that governments that decide to send troops into an international mission make sure that the interest of their state is strong enough to maintain engagement even if success does not come as quickly as originally planned. In many cases, the long-term effects of a failed or aborted mission would be worse than if no intervention had taken place.

The key question for any state that considers military intervention is whether a given situation (civil war, regional war, state failure, spread of organised crime such as piracy, etc.) can be dealt with by military force alone. Thus, in the Indian Ocean, the question is rightly asked what an armada of modern battleships can actually do against piracy originating from a country like Somalia in the absence of basic ele-ments of effective statehood and development in the country. In Afghanistan, the United States and its allies had to learn (again) that a war against an insurgency cannot be won by military means alone.

While we still have much to learn, we know that a comprehensive ‘smart power' strategy is needed that combines both military and civilian efforts and allows for effective coordination and consultation among all involved actors. Not every conflict can be solved by diplomatic means alone. It also remains true, however, that armed forces cannot solve political problems. Armed forces can stabilise a situation, and give local and international actors breathing space to work out political solutions. The success of any military mission is only possible if it is part of a larger political endeavour to resolve the underlying conflicts.

Volker Perthes is director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin