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Back to the future: nonproliferation in a multi-polar world
Arundhati Ghose

The current international nonproliferation regime is increasingly unstable. Although shaken by the nuclear programmes of states such as North Korea, the US rejection of cold war arms control treaties, and the clandestine proliferation networks stemming from Pakistan, the main reason for the regime's instability lies not in these contemporary developments, but in the structure of the regime itself. The idea of nonproliferation was originally conceived by most states as a method through which a transition to a world free of nuclear weapons could be achieved. Therefore, nonproliferation was a means, not an objective. The debates on the subject at that time centred on the concept of a balance of obligations: vertical proliferation-ie the further development of nuclear weapons by states that already possessed them-would be stopped as an initial step, before their reduction and eventual elimination. In the transitional period, horizontal proliferation-ie the spread of nuclear weapons and technology to states that did not already possess them-would be forbidden. These states would be permitted to develop civilian nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and their protection from nuclear weapons would be guaranteed by the UN. Only a return to this original formulation could provide the current regime with much needed stability. Paradoxically, therefore, the future of nonproliferation lies in its past.

The evolution of nuclear nonproliferation
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which came into effect in 1970, failed to meet the conditions originally established for it. On the contrary, although the NPT hindered horizontal proliferation by authorising the possession of nuclear weapons only to the five possessor states, vertical proliferation was largely ignored. Indeed, nuclear weapons, the nuclear regime and the concept of horizontal nonproliferation became increasingly central to the security doctrines of the nuclear weapon states. In the bipolar world of the cold war, this basic inequity was resented. Fierce yet futile efforts were made by the non-nuclear weapon states to restore the balance originally proposed for the regime. In spite of this, most countries acquiesced to the situation, with three exceptions who became known as the "outliers"- India stayed out of the treaty, citing its inherent inequities and their implications for India's security; Pakistan followed India; and Israel never joined for its own reasons.

Two factors determined this evolution. First and foremost was the international distribution of power at that time. It is widely accepted that international regimes, including systems of arms control, are shaped and sustained by the interests of the major powers of the day. International regimes are not "democratic"; they do not necessarily reflect the interests of the majority of states which become a party to them. For example, if the international system is dominated by a single hegemon and it decides that a particular regime is, or is not in its security interests, that power can introduce modifications to that regime. A regime will weaken or undergo change only if the distribution of power in the international order changes. During the time of cold war bipolarity, both superpowers had to agree on the shape of the nonproliferation regime and the need to sustain it in a particular form. Their objectives were to control access to these weapons by Germany, Japan and Italy.

Second, other powers were persuaded to join this approach, either by inclusion, or by extending the spread of the protection of nuclear weapons to the allies and friends of the major determining powers. Through these, and other, more subtle forms of coercion that worked at diplomatic, economic and political levels, most countries were also "persuaded" to join the regime, even if it was not in their security interests to do so.

Disintegration of the regime
With the end of the cold war and the emergence of a single superpower, several developments took place that undermined the nonproliferation regime. In 1991, the first Gulf war revealed Iraq's clandestine weapons of mass destruction programme. Consequently, it was deemed preferable for control over the non-nuclear states to be increased. As such the Additional Protocol, which called for intrusive inspections even on undeclared facilities, was adopted.

What was more significant for the weakening of the regime was that the NPT, with all its inequalities and flaws, was extended indefinitely while under review in 1995. This was a factor that led to India's nuclear tests of 1998 (followed by Pakistan), but it also had a much deeper significance. By legitimizing the possession of nuclear weapons by a few states for their security for an indefinite period of time, it opened the way for other states to adopt this security approach too. This is evident in the cases of Iran, the North Korea and Libya. In any case, large scale proliferation had been going on among states party to the NPT; most nuclear weapon states, according to Gordon Correra, "proliferated nuclear technology based on perceived strategic priorities-the United States to the UK, France to Israel, the Soviet Union to China, China to Pakistan." This led to a degree of instability in the regime that remains to this day.

The US, for its part, reacted by rejecting the network of arms control treaties developed in the context of the cold war. Further jolted by the cataclysmic events of September 11 2001, the US turned its attention to preventing WMD, including nuclear weapons, falling into the hands of non-state actors, their alleged sponsors and other failing or rogue states. Mechanisms and structures were established such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Container Security Initiative and, with Russia, the Global Initiative Against Nuclear Terrorism. However, it was the revelation of the so-called AQ Khan network that appeared to seriously undermine the foundations of the nonproliferation regime. This international clandestine network included a number of businessmen worldwide and was involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea. The demand for security and power that nuclear weapons had come to symbolize was therefore being met by the commercial interests of businesses in Europe, Canada, the US, South Africa and south-east Asia. The linkages between Pakistan, China and North Korea have been described in detail in several publications.

Despite these challenges to the nonproliferation regime, the apparent consensus on nonproliferation was sustained mainly because it remained an important element of US foreign policy. The US has even tried to persuade India to enter the regime by offering international cooperation in civil nuclear energy, even while tacitly acknowledging India's nuclear weapons status.

Nonproliferation in a multi-polar world
Today, the role of the US as the unchallenged single superpower is somewhat diminished both by the disastrous war in Iraq and a troubled economy. Undoubtedly the US remains the preeminent power in world affairs, but this does not preclude the fact that other powers are making their presence felt on the international stage. Europe, after decades of navel gazing appears to be looking outward again, with its uniquely European view on international affairs. Russia is resurgent and challenging the single hegemon. Meanwhile, China's economic muscle is complemented by its increasing military might; its engagement with the US is both deep and wary at the same time.

At the moment, all major powers appear to be in favour of maintaining the current status quo with regards to the nonproliferation regime, and seem agreeable to allowing the US to lead and shape it. In this multi-polar world, however, there is the increasing possibility of change in the nonproliferation regime, so long as the different "poles" can put aside their suspicions and distrust of each other and agree to a common position. There are at least three urgent tasks on which agreement is imperative if the world is not to face an even more dangerous future.

First, and most importantly, a new and genuine consensus between nuclear and non-nuclear powers must be built. Existing structures need not be abandoned; control of both material and technology for example, will continue to be necessary. At the same time, elements jettisoned from the originally formulated NPT should be revived. For example, non-possessor states have been pressing for negative security assurances which guarantee that they would not be targeted or threatened by nuclear weapons. To an extent, this was the demand of the non-nuclear weapon states in their designation of certain regions as "nuclear weapons-free zones". Unfortunately, commitments by the nuclear weapon states, even where they exist, are not absolute. Removing such conditionality would allay the fear of non-possessor states and prevent them from seeking protection by way of acquiring nuclear weapons. Indeed, one of the main dangers of proliferation today arises from non-nuclear weapon states that fear "regime change" by foreign forces.

At the same time, the damage done by the indefinite extension of the NPT could be partially ameliorated by possessor states making clear their aversion to the use of nuclear weapons and reducing their salience in their respective security doctrines. This step would gain credibility if nuclear states made stronger commitments to further reduce the number of weapons in their arsenals within a limited time frame. This would convince the non-nuclear states that disarmament is the final objective. In other words, nonproliferation should once again be conceived as a tool for the transition towards a nuclear weapons-free world.

Second, the emergence on the world stage of non-state actors, inspired by either religious fundamentalism or ethno-nationalism, combined with increasing globalisation, creates fertile ground for WMD terrorism. Coordinated and effective measures must be taken to ensure that these groups are prevented from gaining access to nuclear material and technology. Nuclear weapons, technology and material in failing or unstable states are a particular cause of concern, and these need to be securely and safely managed. This cannot be done by any single country alone; a true consensus will have to be built.

Third, civilian nuclear energy is witnessing a renaissance, triggered by the high price of hydrocarbons, the scarcity of natural resources and the dangers of climate change. As nuclear power is increasingly utilised, the opportunities for proliferation, whether accidental, deliberate or as a result of inadequate security arrangements, also increase. Better safeguards need to be developed. The AQ Khan network should not be repeated. It will not be possible to stop countries from wanting and acquiring civilian nuclear technology, even by clandestine means; therefore it is in the interests of the international community to ensure that needs are met, but in a secure and safeguarded environment.

A further issue remains: how should the international community deal with the three "outlier" states? Various suggestions have been made, including a protocol appending the NPT, which would treat the three countries "as if" they were NPT recognized nuclear weapon states. Israel remains deliberately non-committal about joining the current NPT regime. Pakistan has said it would join if India did so; India is currently unwilling to join the NPT and is unlikely to change its stance in the foreseeable future. According to India, the problem lies in the treaty itself, and not in India's policy of staying out. From recent statements, however, it would appear that India's position is shifting, not towards the NPT, but towards the nonproliferation regime. It might be possible to work out a formula through which India accepts the same restraints as accepted by those with equivalent levels of nuclear technology without compromising on its economic and security needs, and while continuing to utilise its considerable expertise in the nuclear field. Pakistan's case is different. Its history of clandestine trade in nuclear weapons technology both inwards and outwards and its current political fragility might require more careful handling.

A change in approach
In the final analysis, the existing NPT approach, which abandoned nonproliferation as a means to a nuclear-free world has been the underlying cause of most problems in the current regime. Blatant inequities have given rise to insecurities and therefore instability. This approach will necessarily have to be abandoned. A new consensus would therefore be a transitional mechanism, as originally intended. Nuclear disarmament will entail complex and drawn-out negotiations. The process will include grappling with many issues such as verification, the huge gap in the application of high technology to conventional weapons, and the idea that nuclear weapons can act as equalisers in the security interests of countries.

With such complexities, what is the feasibility of developing a new consensus? Recent events offer traces of hope; four eminent Americans recently proposed that the US and Russia take the lead in working towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They are supported by many distinguished Americans who have previously held positions in charge of the US nuclear weapons programme; and by others in the UK and Russia. Leadership in this matter from the United States, even if not from the government, is significant in itself for the simple reason that the US is the preeminent power, albeit in a multi-polar system. However, the tasks elaborated above will have to be implemented by all nuclear weapon states, regardless of whether they are parties to the NPT or not. The US, Russia, Europe, China and even India, among others, will have to agree on which issues they can move forward. Clearly, a continuation of the current situation is both untenable and does not presage well for international peace and security.

ARUNDHATI GHOSE is a Delhi-based security analyst and a former permanent representative of India to the UN in Geneva.