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Russia at the crossroads
Alexander Arkhangelski

It is impossible to understand Russian national history and traditions without taking into account Russia's imperial legacy. For many centuries, the Russian heartland's modus operandi was characterised by continuous expansion, with the public domain prevailing over the private, the sovereign over the individual. Indeed, this imperialist urge soon became part of Russia's national culture, reflected in its universal openness, the receptiveness of its people to the outside world, and its ability to swiftly digest foreign novelties and turn them into local customs. This national culture in turn helped to keep the imperial idea alive throughout the different epochs of Russia's history, including during the Soviet period.

However, this imperial ethos was forcefully disrupted in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia experienced the loss of more territory than it had done during the previous six centuries. The economic and political turbulence of the 1990s meant that Russia's much contracted national territory was likewise subject to centripetal pressures. Calls for greater autonomy from certain regions descended, in places, into inter-ethnic tensions and sometimes violence. While in the past, Russia's top priority had been to keep expanding geographically, after 1991 the Russian leadership has had to focus on national consolidation, securing the national territory against threats of further fragmentation.

Securing national consolidation in a country as culturally diverse as Russia, with such a turbulent history, is no easy task, however. What is clear is that Russia needs to construct, or reconstruct, a national idea that is built on a civic sense of identity, which emphasises common values and aspirations rather than exclusive ethnic loyalties. Such a civic form of nationalism is a crucial requirement if Russia is to strengthen the sense of attachment among its many ethnic groups to a single state and single language, thereby bolstering aspirations for a shared future. Only such a civic nationalism will be able to bind together Russia's multi-ethnic population and replace Russia's long-standing imperial identity. The need to develop a civic form of nationalism has become especially urgent today, in view of Russia's declining indigenous population and its subsequent demand for migrant workers in order to sustain its current rate of economic development. Local mortality rates are much higher than those in developed countries, while fertility rates are much lower. According to the UN's average forecast of 2002, this downward demographic trend is likely to continue, and Russia's current population of 144million could dwindle to 101.5 million by the middle of the current century. With a territory that covers nearly 13% of the world's landmass, Russia has more land than its population can effectively settle. Russia is therefore deeply dependent on inward migration. Already many challenging economic tasks, for example in agriculture and other physically demanding sectors such as construction, are performed by migrants from China or central Asian countries.

While the need to foster a shared national identity is clear, how to create a civic national idea in Russia is not at all obvious. The aim of this introductory essay is neither to provide a blueprint for achieving this, nor to explain the origins of the critical situation Russia now finds itself in. (These issues are tackled in Tishkov's essay later in this reader). Instead, the aim is to help set the scene for readers to better understand Russia's predicament.

To a certain degree, today, as a result of international migration, many if not all countries are facing similar problems of national self-definition. It might even be said that a similar quest is being pursued in the European Union, where the objective is to forge a new supranational identity. However, in Russia the challenge of fostering a civic form of nationalism is especially complex as the two historical experiences that have helped to bind the country together in the past-Russia's imperial and Soviet legacies-are no longer available to draw upon. Therefore, today, while it is more or less clear what it means to be an ethnic Russian or Tatar, or even a Muscovite, Uralian or Siberian, there is no clear understanding of what it means to be a Russian citizen. Grappling with this problem will require starting afresh and developing a clear definition of who we are, where we come from, what ethos and values we embrace. Only this way can Russia hope to build a new civic identity that can bind together the numerous ethnicities that make up the Russian state.

However, the risks involved in this process are numerous. Efforts to redefine the Russian state in purely civic terms are likely to provoke a surge in ethnic nationalist feelings among Russia's people, especially among those groups that have historically been suppressed under Russia's various imperial regimes. Interestingly, these ethnic nationalist feelings are likely to be increasingly expressed not only by Russia's smaller ethnic communities, but also by the Russian (ethnic) people. And herein lies one of the greatest difficulties for those endeavouring to construct a civic identity for the Russian Federation. Psychologically traumatised by the loss of empire, by the sudden transformation of Russia's economic and political system, and by the economic hardships of the 1990s, ethnic Russians have started to define their national identity through the prism of religious affiliation. According to numerous surveys, over 70% of respondents declare themselves to be Orthodox Christians although no more than 5% attend church on a regular basis. This suggests that "Orthodox Christianity" has become an easy substitute for Russian ethnicity.

Today, as a result of this development, ethnic Russians have a tendency to think that they are unique in a number of ways. This increased national sensibility among ethnic Russians, whilst important in the process of building a sense of patriotism towards the new post-Soviet Russian state, has its dangers. It must not be forgotten that Russia is a multi-ethnic and multi-faith country, where many religions besides Orthodox Christianity have deep roots. The current tendency among many ethnic Russians to see Orthodox Christianity as a mandatory component of Russian nationalism is likely to trigger a destructive surge in nationalist sentiment on the part of Tatars, Bashkirs, Ingushis and other ethnic communities that practice or associate themselves with Islam or other faiths. Domestic political tensions are therefore likely to escalate. Moreover, the rise of ethnic nationalist sentiment (with its exclusionary emphasis) is likely to push mainstream political elites towards fascist ideas. Faced with the slightest economic hardship or policy-making crisis, moderate ethnic nationalism is likely to be transformed into a dangerous and potentially violent ideology.

Whatever the difficulties involved in constructing a civic form of nationalism, Russia must not shirk away from this task. Should it fail in the endeavour, the consequences will be very grave indeed. If, on the other hand, Russia is able to handle national sensibilities in a balanced manner, refrain from using them for political ends, isolate the key problems and channel them accordingly, nationalism could very well be transformed from a lethal virus into a cultural injection against chauvinism. One cannot know in advance which of the two nationalist tracks will prevail in Russia in the 21st century. Will the general public, and hence politicians, embrace fascism? Or will the country be unified on a supranational level around a fresh set of civic values? The answer will depend on a number of factors, including Russia's historical evolution, the efforts of Russia's intellectual elites, and some sustained creativity on the part of the government.

In order to achieve this, the tasks and responsibilities of Russia's cultural, educational, media and knowledge-sharing institutions would need to grow in volume and complexity. However, unassisted, these cultural and educational communities will not be able to fulfil this historic task. Political leadership is needed too.

But, what kind of leadership? Most people seem to have accepted that in the 21st century Russia's political system will be characterised by a "soft" form of authoritarianism. Advocates of this soft authoritarianism defend the system as superior to both liberal democracy and totalitarianism, avoiding the unpredictability of the former, and the belligerence of the latter. My own candid assessment is that it will not be possible to build a sense of civic nationhood in Russia under conditions of authoritarianism. For unlike a democracy, even a qualified democracy, an authoritarian regime would not allow the type of fair and open public debate that is needed in order to develop shared values at the grass roots level. Moreover, unlike a totalitarian system, the authoritarian model has no pervasive ideological tools at its disposal, and would therefore fail to impose national values from above.

Russia therefore finds itself today at a crossroads. Either it builds a smooth-running totalitarian machine and makes it work effectively or it gradually dismantles its rigid vertical administration and reduces manipulation of the political system. If it fails to act now, it will be unable to develop a new set of values that all Russians, professors and miners, large city dwellers and small town residents, Siberians and Muscovites, can share. Without a clear idea of the values that hold it together, Russia will not, in turn, be able to develop and pursue a coherent set of domestic or foreign policies. Lack of clarity and focus will only lead to a policy of rushing from one extreme to the other. This would not bode well for the future of Russia and therefore the rest of the world.

ALEXANDER ARKHANGELSKI is author and presenter of the Russian television show Tem Vremenem.